24 December 2024 - Legal Updates

1. Conditions to Invoke Section 53A of Transfer of Property Act: Supreme Court

The Supreme Court recently held that a transferee cannot seek protection under Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (TPA) if they are unable to demonstrate the execution of the sale agreement on which their possession is based. The Court also outlined the conditions for invoking Section 53-A. The bench, consisting of Justice J.B. Pardiwala and Justice R. Mahadevan, was considering a plea challenging the Karnataka High Court's decision, which upheld the rulings of the First Appellate Court and the Trial Court in favor of the plaintiff-respondent, granting a declaration of title and recovery of possession.

The Petitioners-Defendants claimed possession of 2 Guntas of land based on a sale agreement allegedly executed by the Respondent-Plaintiff. In response to the Respondent's suit for title declaration and recovery of possession, the Petitioners invoked Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act (TPA), arguing they were protected as prospective transferees under part-performance of the contract. They asserted that the Respondent had executed a Sale Agreement on 25.11.1968, which granted them possession and enjoyment of the property, and claimed that Section 53-A barred the Respondent from enforcing the contract against them.

The Trial Court ruled in favor of the Respondent-Plaintiff, granting the suit, and this decision was upheld by both the First Appellate Court and the High Court. The High Court observed that since the defendant failed to prove that the plaintiff had executed the Sale Agreement dated 25.11.1968 for the sale of 2 Guntas from Survey No. 24/9, and that the defendant took possession of the property based on that agreement, the protection under Section 53-A of the TPA did not apply. Section 53-A of the TPA protects a prospective transferee who holds possession of immovable property under an unexecuted (unregistered) sale contract. The provision prevents the transferor from enforcing the contract against the transferee when the transferee has acted in accordance with the written agreement.

The Court highlighted that Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act was introduced to address conflicting views and primarily to protect transferees who, relying on ineffective transfer documents or unregistered contracts, take possession or make improvements on the property. The section relaxes the strict requirements of the Transfer of Property and Registration Acts, allowing the defense of part-performance.

In this case, the petitioners argued that although the respondents (plaintiffs) might be the lawful owners, they had executed a sale agreement on 25-11-1968, agreeing to sell 2 Guntas of land for Rs.850/-, and the petitioners had been in possession and enjoyment of the property since then. The Court had to decide whether the petitioners could claim part-performance under Section 53-A of the TPA.

The Court upheld the High Court's decision, stating that the petitioner's inability to prove that the respondent had executed a sale agreement in their favor disqualified them from claiming part-performance of the contract. The Court also outlined that the protection under Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act for a prospective purchaser/transferee is available only if specific prerequisites are met.

(a) There is a written contract by the transferor for the transfer of immovable property for consideration, signed by him or on his behalf, from which the terms required to establish the transfer can be determined with reasonable certainty.

(b) The transferee has taken possession of the property, or any part of it, as part-performance of the contract, or if the transferee was already in possession, they continue to hold possession in part-performance of the contract.

(c) The transferee has done some act in furtherance of the contract and has performed or is willing to perform his part of the contract.”

The Court refused to grant the petitioners the benefit of Section 53-A of the TPA, as they did not fulfill its required conditions. The alleged sale agreement could not be proven, and the petitioners' possession was not legally valid under the claimed agreement. As a result, the petition was dismissed.

Case- Giriyappa & Anr. vs. Kamalamma & Ors.

2. Not Necessary to File Separate Application For Delay Condonation Along With Application To Set Aside Ex-Parte Decree: Supreme Court

The Supreme Court ruled that a separate application for condonation of delay is not required to be filed along with an application to set aside an ex-parte decree under Order IX Rule 13 of the Civil Procedure Code, as long as the application provides a sufficient explanation for the delay. The bench, consisting of Justice Vikram Nath and Justice Prasanna B. Varale, was hearing an appeal challenging the Allahabad High Court's decision, which upheld the First Appellate Court's ruling. The First Appellate Court had overturned the trial court's order allowing the Appellant-Defendant's restoration application for the ex-parte decree, on the grounds that a separate application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act was not filed with the Order IX Rule 13 application.

The case involves the restoration of a civil suit in which an ex-parte decree was issued, declaring a sale deed null and void due to fraud. The restoration application was filed five months after the ex-parte decree. The appellant-defendant argued that he was elderly and uneducated, relying entirely on his previous counsel, who failed to inform him about the proceedings. The Respondent-Plaintiff contended that since the application was filed beyond the 30-day time limit, it could not be maintained without a separate application for condonation of delay.

The issue before the Court was whether a separate application for condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act was mandatory. The judgment, written by Justice Nath, answered in the negative, stating that Order IX Rule 13 of the CPC permits the restoration of an ex-parte decree even after the prescribed time limit if a sufficient cause is demonstrated. The Court observed that the restoration application adequately explained the delay, as the appellant was not informed about the ex-parte decree by his previous counsel.

The Court observed that the restoration application included all necessary elements for a delay condonation application, as established in the case of Bhagmal and Ors. v. Kunwar Lal and Others (2010). Therefore, it held that a separate application for condoning the delay was not required under the Limitation Act. The Court agreed with the appellate court's decision, which considered the merits of the Order 9 Rule 13 application. It emphasized that the appellant defendants were justified in filing the application when they did, as they were unaware of the ex-parte decree and proceedings. The Court criticized the High Court for taking a hyper technical view by insisting on a separate application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act.

The Court stated that the application under Order 9 Rule 13 CPC contained all the necessary elements for condoning the delay, emphasizing that procedural rules serve justice. It further clarified that there was no need for a separate application for delay condonation in this case, criticizing the High Court for taking a hyper-technical approach. The Court stressed that such an approach would undermine the purpose of judicial procedure and prevent a just outcome. The appellant acted in good faith and did not violate any legal provisions. As a result, the appeal was allowed.

Case- Dwarika Prasad (D) Thr. Lrs. Vs. Prithvi Raj Singh

3. Bail is an Essential Element of The Criminal Justice System, Guarantees Right to Fair Trial: Calcutta High Court

The Calcutta High Court ruled that bail is a crucial component of the criminal justice system, as it ensures the accused's right to a fair trial in a criminal case. Justice Shampa (Dutt) Paul made these remarks in response to a plea by a man accused under the POCSO Act, challenging the trial court's order that had canceled his bail.

"Bail is the norm, and imprisonment is the exception. This aligns with Article 21 of the Indian Constitution, which guarantees the protection of life and personal liberty to all citizens. Article 21 ensures the 'right to life and personal liberty' for every individual, and no one can be deprived of it except through a procedure established by law. It affirms the fundamental right to live with dignity and personal freedom."

"According to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, a person is presumed innocent until proven guilty. Therefore, no one should be deprived of their personal liberty unless a fair and just procedure dictates otherwise. Bail is a crucial component of the criminal justice system, as it upholds the right to a fair trial for the accused. It serves as a mechanism to safeguard the accused’s liberty without granting them any unjustified advantage," she further stated.

The present revisional application was filed against an order passed by the Judge of the Special Court, Lalbagh, Murshidabad, in a POCSO case originating from Jiaganj P.S. Case under Sections 376/306 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 4 of the POCSO Act, 2012. Initially, the accused was charged under Section 306 of the Indian Penal Code. The accused had been granted bail, the trial had begun, and there had been no apparent violation of the bail conditions.

Court noted that there is no observation that the accused had

(i) Misused his liberty by indulging in similar criminal activity,

(ii) Interfered with the, course of trial,

(iii) Attempted to tamper with evidence or witnesses,

(iv) Threatened witnesses or indulged in similar activities which would hamper smooth conduct of trial and

(v) There is likelihood of his fleeing to another country.

Accordingly, it set aside the order passed by the trial court.

Case- Shyamchand Mondal vs. The State of West Bengal & Anr.