11 December 2024 - Legal Updates

1. Section 498A IPC Often Used Against Husband & His Family to Meet Wife’s Unreasonable Demands, Growing Tendency of Misuse: Supreme Court

The Supreme Court, while dismissing a Section 498A IPC (Section 85 of BNS) case against a husband and his in-laws, reiterated its concern over the growing trend of implicating all members of the husband's family during domestic disputes arising from marital discord. The Court also criticized the increasing misuse of provisions like Section 498-A IPC, which are being exploited as a means of personal vendetta against the husband and his relatives. In a similar vein, the Court had previously urged caution to ensure that distant relatives of the husband are not wrongly included in criminal cases filed by a wife accusing domestic cruelty.

The bench, consisting of Justices B.V. Nagarathna and N. Kotiswar Singh, observed that Section 498-A IPC has increasingly become a tool for wives or their relatives to settle personal scores with the husband and his family, often without regard for the provision's true intent. Originally, the amendment introducing Section 498A IPC aimed to prevent cruelty against women by their husbands and in-laws, ensuring prompt state intervention. However, with the rise in matrimonial disputes and growing tensions within marriages, the provision has been misused as a means to take personal revenge against the husband and his family. The judgment, written by Justice Nagarathna, emphasized that vague or generalized allegations made during marital conflicts, if unchecked, could lead to the abuse of legal procedures and encourage coercion by the wife and her family. In some instances, Section 498A IPC has been invoked to force the husband to meet unreasonable demands. As a result, the Court has repeatedly warned against prosecuting the husband and his family without a clear prima facie case against them.

The Court heard the criminal appeal filed by the husband and his in-laws challenging the Telangana High Court's decision, which had refused to quash the domestic cruelty case filed by the wife against them. The wife had initiated the case after the husband filed a petition seeking the dissolution of their marriage. Criticizing this move, the Court emphasized that the purpose of the provision was to protect wives subjected to cruelty in the matrimonial home, particularly due to unlawful demands for dowry or valuable security. However, in this case, the complainant-wife had misused the provision as a retaliatory measure against the husband’s petition for divorce.

The Court clarified, "We are not suggesting that any woman who has experienced cruelty, as defined under Section 498A of the IPC, should remain silent or refrain from filing a complaint or initiating criminal proceedings. That is not the intent of our observations. However, we do not support cases like the present one, where a complaint under Section 498A IPC is filed as a countermeasure against a petition for dissolution of marriage filed by the husband. The purpose of this provision is primarily to protect women who face cruelty in the matrimonial home, particularly due to unlawful demands for dowry or valuable security. Unfortunately, as seen in this case, it is sometimes misused." The Court found that the High Court had made a significant error by not quashing the FIR against the appellants and consequently, the pending case against them was dismissed. The appeal was thus allowed.

Case- Dara Lakshmi Narayan & Others vs. State of Telangana & Another

2. Section 58(c) of TPA | Mere Possession of Property By Mortgagor Wouldn’t Make Mortgage By Conditional Sale A Simple Mortgage: Supreme Court

The Supreme Court observed that allowing a mortgagor to remain in possession does not transform the transaction into a 'simple mortgage' if the deed specifies that the mortgagor’s failure to redeem the property within the agreed time would result in the transfer of the mortgaged property to the mortgagee under a 'mortgage by conditional sale' as per Section 58(c) of the Transfer of Property Act, 1872. The bench, consisting of Justice Vikram Nath and Justice Prasanna B. Varale, was hearing a civil appeal filed by the defendant against the High Court's decision, which upheld the Trial Court's ruling in favor of the respondent-plaintiff's suit for redemption of the mortgaged property.

In 1990, the respondent-plaintiff mortgaged a property for ₹75,000, agreeing to repay ₹1,20,000 (including interest) within three years. The mortgage deed included a clause stating that failure to redeem within the stipulated time would convert the mortgage into an absolute sale. In 1993, the plaintiff tried to redeem the mortgage by offering the full amount, but the defendant refused, claiming the mortgage had already become a sale due to the plaintiff's delay. The plaintiff then filed a suit seeking redemption of the mortgage and a declaration that the defendant’s claim of ownership was invalid. The trial court ruled in favor of the plaintiff, stating the conversion of the mortgage into a sale was a "clog on the equity of redemption" and allowed the plaintiff to redeem the property by paying ₹1,20,000.

The High Court upheld the trial court's decision leading to the filing of the appeal by the defendant before the Supreme Court.

The key factors that need to be considered while deciding whether the mortgage was by conditional sale or not are:

• Nature of Possession: The possession was permissive and at the discretion of the defendant. It was not an indication of ownership or an absolute right but was granted to safeguard the property.
• Intention of the Parties: The intention, as explicitly stated in the mortgage deed and corroborated by DW1's testimony, was that the property would become the absolute property of the defendant upon default of payment within the stipulated period.
• Terms of the Mortgage Deed: The mortgage deed allowed the defendant to use the land and specified that the right of the mortgagor to reclaim the property would be extinguished upon default.”

The Supreme Court, in its judgment authored by Justice Vikram Nath, set aside the lower court decisions, stating that the courts below erred in not recognizing the transaction as a mortgage by conditional sale under Section 58(c) of the Transfer of Property Act (TPA). The Court noted that all the essential elements of a mortgage by conditional sale were met, including the ostensible sale of the property by the mortgagor to the mortgagee, with a condition that the sale would become absolute if the payment was not made within three years. Additionally, the Court found that the lower courts incorrectly concluded that the plaintiff’s continuous possession of the property invalidated the possibility of the transaction being a mortgage by conditional sale.

 The Court observed that the permissive possession granted by the defendant to the plaintiff was a practical arrangement, as the plaintiff was already living on the land, and it did not provide any additional rights beyond those specified in the mortgage deed. The Court found that the Trial Court and High Court erred in concluding that the plaintiff’s continuous possession invalidated the transaction as a mortgage by conditional sale. It emphasized that the mortgage deed’s intention was for the mortgagor to retain possession with the condition that the property would be transferred if the mortgage was not redeemed within the stipulated time. The Court also clarified that the plaintiff's possession was 'permissive,' meaning he was not entitled to claim any extra benefits from the mortgage deed.

The Court criticized the Trial Court and High Court for focusing too much on the plaintiff’s possession of the suit land after the mortgage deed was executed, and mistakenly concluding that this made the transaction a simple mortgage rather than a mortgage by conditional sale. The Court clarified that the possession was permissive, intended to safeguard the property, and did not alter the nature of the transaction. The Court further stated that the lower courts had erred in disregarding the clear terms of the registered mortgage deed and wrongly treated the condition as a clog on the equity of redemption. The Court held that the mortgage deed satisfied all the statutory requirements for a mortgage by conditional sale. Consequently, the appeal was allowed.

Case- Leela Agrawal vs. Sarkar & Anr.

3. Hindu Succession Act | Supreme Court Refers to Larger Bench Conflicting Opinions on Female Hindu’s Rights Under Section 14

The Supreme Court addressed the inconsistencies and conflicting interpretations regarding the relationship between Sections 14(1) and 14(2) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, which governs the rights of Hindu women in property they inherit or possess. The bench, consisting of Justice PS Narasimha and Justice Sandeep Mehta, examined the discrepancies in judicial precedents. One set of precedents supports the female Hindu's absolute right to ownership of property received in recognition of her pre-existing rights under Section 14(1) of the HSA. In contrast, another set of precedents, relying on Section 14(2) of the HSA, does not recognize her absolute ownership unless the property was received before or at the time of the enactment of the HSA.

The lead precedent that advanced the female Hindu cause was V. Tulasamma & Ors. v. Sesha Reddy (Dead) by LRs (1977) and was followed in a number of other precedents such as Gulwant Kaur v. Mohinder Singh (1987), Thota Sesharathamma v. Thota Manikyamma (1991), Balwant Kaur v. Chanan Singh & Ors. (2000), Shakuntala Devi v. Kamla (2005), Jupudy Pardha Sarathy v. Pentapati Rama Krishna (2016) and V. Kalyanaswamy v. L. Bakthavatsalam (2020).

Whereas, the lead precedent that restricts the right of female Hindu to hold property was Karmi v. Amru (1972) and was followed in several other precedents such as Bhura and Ors. v. Kashiram (1994), Gumpha v. Jaibai (1994), and Sadhu Singh v. Gurdwara Sahib Narike & Ors (2006).

In V. Tulasamma's case, the Court clarified the interplay between Sections 14(1) and 14(2) of the Hindu Succession Act, noting that both provisions operate in distinct contexts. Section 14(2) applies only to instruments that create new, independent rights for women, such as awards, gifts, or decrees, and does not apply when the instrument merely confirms or recognizes pre-existing rights. The Court emphasized that in cases where a woman receives property in lieu of maintenance or a share in partition, Section 14(2) is not applicable, and the woman's limited interest would automatically be converted into an absolute one under Section 14(1), overriding any restrictions in the instrument.

In Sadhu Singh's case, the Court, citing Karmi v. Amru, outlined key factors for applying Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act, including the property's antecedents, the female's possession of the property at the time the Act came into force, and her existing rights, however limited. The Court ruled that a female Hindu's acquisition of property after the Act's enforcement would not typically invoke Section 14(1) unless she acquired absolute rights, such as through inheritance. If restrictions were placed on her rights, Section 14(2) would apply. Recognizing the need for a clear, authoritative ruling, the Court directed that the case be referred to the Chief Justice of India to form a larger bench to reconcile conflicting interpretations of Sections 14(1) and 14(2) of the Act. 

Background

Kanwar Bhan executed a Will in favor of his wife, who, after his death, transferred the property received through the Will to the appellants (purchasers) via a registered sale deed. However, the legal heirs of Kanwar's wife challenged the transaction, arguing that she did not have absolute ownership under Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act (HSA), but only a restrictive right under Section 14(2). The Trial Court dismissed the suit, reaffirming the principles in V. Tulasamma's case, and the First Appellate Court upheld this decision. However, the High Court, in a second appeal, disagreed, citing the principles in Sadhu Singh's case. The appellants (purchasers) then filed an appeal before the Supreme Court.

Case- Tej Bhan (D) Through LR. & Ors. vs. Ram Kishan (D) Through LRS. & Ors.