25 April 2025 Legal Updates

  LANDLORD'S FAMILY'S NEEDS ALSO COUNT AS 'BONA FIDE REQUIREMENT' FOR TENANT'S EVICTION: SUPREME COURT  

(a) Case Title:

• Murlidhar Aggarwal (D.) Thr. His LR. Atul Kumar Aggarwal v. Mahendra Pratap Kakan (D.) Thr. LRS. and Ors. 

(b) Court:

• Supreme Court of India

(c) Date of Decision: 

• 24th April 2025 

(d) Bench:  

• Justices M.M. Sundresh and K.V. Viswanathan 

Key Facts:

The case involved a cinema building ("Mansarovar Palace") in Allahabad, leased in 1952 for 10 years. The appellant’s predecessor purchased the property in 1962, but the tenant (respondent) continued occupying it even after the lease expired.  Previous eviction attempts under rent control laws failed due to procedural issues. 

The appellant sought eviction under Section 21(1)(a) of the Uttar Pradesh Urban Buildings Act, 1972, citing bona fide need for the property to start a business to support his family. 

Procedural History:

The Rent Control Tribunal allowed the eviction, finding the appellant’s need genuine and financial condition precarious.  The High Court reversed the order, doubting the appellant’s need due to alleged involvement in other family businesses. 

Supreme Court’s Analysis:

1. Bona Fide Need: 

• The SC upheld the Tribunal’s findings, noting the appellant’s meagre income (salary of ₹1,200/month) and lack of alternative businesses. 
• Section 21(7) of the 1972 Act permits legal heirs (here, Atul Kumar Aggarwal) to continue the eviction plea based on their own need. Atul’s affidavit confirmed his crippled condition and lack of income. 

2. Comparative Hardship: 

• The tenant (respondent) on the other hand had multiple businesses (cinemas in Ghazipur, Varanasi) and failed to prove inability to relocate. 
• The appellant’s hardship outweighed the tenant’s, as the latter had occupied the property for 63 years post-lease expiry. 

3. Precedents Cited: 

• Mohd. Ayub v. Mukesh Chand (2012): Tenant’s failure to seek alternative accommodation weakens their case. 
• Sushila v. IInd Addl. District Judge (2003): Long tenancy alone doesn’t justify denial of eviction if landlord’s need is genuine. 

4. Final Decision:

• Eviction ordered; tenant given time till 31 December 2025 to vacate. 

KEY TAKEAWAY:

• Landlord’s genuine and bona fide requirement for self/family use is a valid ground for eviction. 
• Courts balance hardship to both parties; tenant’s long occupancy isn’t decisive if landlord’s need is pressing. 

  WHEN ONE JUDGE HAS HELD PARTY GUILTY OF CONTEMPT, ANOTHER JUDGE OF SAME HC CAN'T TAKE CONTRARY VIEW: SUPREME COURT  

(a) Case Title:

• Rajan Chadha & Anr. v. Sanjay Arora

(b) Court:

• Supreme Court of India 

(c) Date of Decision:

• April 23, 2025 

(d) Bench:

• Justice B.R. Gavai and Justice Augustine George Masih 

Key Facts:

The Appellants are the majority shareholders of RBT Private Ltd. whereas the Respondent is the minority shareholder and director. A Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) was signed in 2019 for the transfer of shares and management re-organization. The Respondent allegedly violated the MoU by siphoning company assets, defaulting on loan EMIs, and operating another entity from the company’s premises. 

Legal Proceedings:

The Appellants initiated arbitration under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, and sought interim relief under Section 9.  The arbitrator directed the Respondent to pay EMIs and preserve company assets. 

The Respondents failed to comply with the said order. The Appellants filed a contempt petition in the Delhi High Court, alleging non-compliance with court and arbitrator orders. 

High Court's Order:

• December 5, 2023: A Single Judge held the Respondent guilty of contempt for wilful violation of orders. 
• July 3, 2024: Another Single Judge (after roster change) dismissed the contempt petition, ruling no wilful disobedience. 

Issue:

Whether the second High Court Judge could overturn the first Judge’s finding of contempt ? 

Supreme Court's Analysis

The second Judge exceeded jurisdiction by reviewing the merits of the contempt finding instead of only considering purging/punishment. 

Judicial propriety bars a coordinate bench from reversing a prior finding of contempt; the Respondent’s remedy if any, was an appeal under Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. 

Decision:

The Supreme Court quashed the July 2024 order and remanded the matter to the High Court to proceed from the December 2023 stage (i.e., deciding punishment). 

  MAGISTRATE'S COGNIZANCE ORDER CAN'T BE FAULTED ONLY BECAUSE IT WASN'T A REASONED ORDER: SUPREME COURT  

(a) Case Title:

• Pramila Devi & Ors. v. The State of Jharkhand & Anr.

(b) Court:

• Supreme Court of India 

(c) Date of Decision:

• April 23, 2025 

(d) Bench:

• Justices Sudhanshu Dhulia and Ahsanuddin Amanullah 

Key Facts

Jyoti Beck (Respondent no.2) claimed deceased Vishnu Sahu married her fraudulently (posing as unmarried) in 1990, and they had three children. She accused the appellants (Pramila Devi who is the 1st wife of Vishnu Sahu and her children) of harassing her, ousting her from a house built on her father’s land, and humiliating her based on her caste (SC/ST Act invoked). 

An FIR lodged in 2016 under IPC Sections 498A (dowry harassment), 406 (criminal breach of trust), 420 (cheating), and SC/ST Act provisions. 

Procedural History:

• The Trial Court took cognizance of the offences in 2019. 
• High Court set aside the cognizance order, remanding it for fresh consideration, citing lack of  ‘prima facie’ material disclosure. 
• Appellants approached the Supreme Court, arguing the FIR was mala fide and a civil dispute masked as a criminal case. 

Issue Decided:

• Whether detailed reasons are required for taking cognizance? 
• Whether the FIR was mala fide or a civil dispute? 

Supreme Court Analysis:

With respect to the first issue the Supreme Court emphasized that magistrates need not pass detailed orders at the cognizance stage. The Trial Court’s order was valid as it noted ‘prima facie’ evidence from the case diary. 

With respect to the second issue the Court declined to quash the FIR, stating that the veracity of evidence must be tested during trial. However, appellants could seek discharge at the framing of charges stage. 

Judgement:

• The Supreme Court set aside the High Court’s remand order, restoring the Trial Court’s cognizance order. 
• Clarified that cognizance requires only ‘prima facie’ satisfaction, not detailed reasoning. 
• Allowed appellants to raise discharge pleas during trial. 

  FOR EVERY INSTANCE OF S.498A IPC MISUSE, THERE ARE HUNDREDS OF GENUINE DOMESTIC CRUELTY CASES: SUPREME COURT  

(a) Case Title:

• Janshruti (People’s Voice) v. Union of India & Ors.

(b) Court:

• Supreme Court of India 

(c) Date of Decision:

• April 15, 2025 

(d) Bench:

• Justice Surya Kant and Justice Nongweikapam Kotiswar Singh 

Background:

A writ petition, filed under Article 32, sought: 

Gender-neutral guidelines for domestic violence complaints. 
A constitutional review of Section 498A IPC (now Section 84 of Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023), alleging misuse and violation of Article 14 (Right to Equality). 

Court's Analysis:

The Court analysed the legislative intent of Section 498 A of the Indian Penal Code and emphasised that  Section 498A was enacted to combat dowry-related cruelty against women, addressing a deep-rooted social evil.  Article 15(3) of the Constitution allows special provisions for women and vulnerable groups.

The Court acknowledged that there is occasional misuse of this provision but ruled it insufficient to invalidate the provision. Further it stressed on case-specific adjudication to address the misuse.  The focused on ground realities while noting that even today there is a need for section 498A to protect women as many cases remain unreported even today.

Key Precedent Cited:

 Sushil Kumar Sharma v. Union of India: Misuse does not render a provision unconstitutional. 

Court’s Decision:

The Supreme Court reaffirmed the constitutional validity of Section 498A, prioritizing its role in protecting women from dowry harassment over claims of gender bias. It also emphasized judicial restraint in interfering with legislative policy unless provisions are: 

• Arbitrary, mala fide, or lack rational nexus with their objective. 
• Violate Fundamental Rights.