17 April 2025 Legal Updates

IF PRIMARY RELIEF IS TIME-BARRED, ANCILLARY RELIEFS ALSO BECOME UNENFORCEABLE: SUPREME COURT

(a) Case:

• Nikhila Divyang Mehta & Anr. v. Hitesh P. Sanghvi & Ors.

(b) Court:

• Supreme Court of India

(c) Date of Decision:

• April 15, 2025

(d) Bench:

• Justice Pankaj Mithal and Justice S.V.N. Bhatti

Key Facts

Hitesh P. Sanghvi (plaintiff) filed a civil suit seeking to declare a Will and Codicil executed by his late father as null and void. The plaintiff's father died on October 21, 2014, and the plaintiff claimed he learned about the Will and Codicil from his sisters in the first week of November 2014. In the plaint, the plaintiff stated that the cause of action arose on three dates: February 4, 2014 (Will registration), September 20, 2014 (Codicil registration), and October 21, 2014 (father's death).The defendants filed applications under Order VII Rule 11 of CPC seeking rejection of the plaint on grounds of limitation. The suit was filed on November 21, 2017, which was more than three years after the plaintiff learned about the documents.

Procedural History

• The City Civil Court, Ahmedabad rejected the plaint under Order VII Rule 11 CPC as being barred by limitation.
• On appeal, the High Court reversed this decision, holding that parties should be allowed to lead evidence on the point of limitation.
• The defendants appealed to the Supreme Court.

Legal Issues

•  Whether the suit was barred by limitation based on the plaintiff's own averments in the plaint?
• Whether limitation is a mixed question of law and fact requiring evidence?
• Whether the plaint could be partially rejected for certain reliefs while maintaining others?

Judgment

The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and held:

• Limitation Period: The suit fell under Article 58 of the Limitation Act, which prescribes a three-year limitation period from when "the right to sue first accrues."
• Calculation of Limitation: Based on the plaintiff's own averments, the cause of action first arose on February 4, 2014, making the limitation period end on February 4, 2017. Even considering the date of knowledge (first week of November 2014), the suit should have been filed by the first week of November 2017.
• No Evidence Required: When the plaint on its face shows the suit is time-barred, no evidence is required to establish limitation.
• Rejection of "Full Knowledge" Argument: The Court rejected the distinction between "knowledge" and "full knowledge," noting that limitation runs from when the cause of action first accrues, not from when complete knowledge is acquired.
• Interdependent Reliefs: The Court held that since the primary relief (declaring the Will and Codicil null and void) was barred by limitation, the ancillary reliefs also could not be granted.
• Mandatory Nature of Section 3: The Court emphasized that Section 3 of the Limitation Act obliges courts to dismiss suits that are barred by limitation, even if limitation is not set up as a defense.

  URDU & HINDI ONE LANGUAGE ACCORDING TO SCHOLARS; LANGUAGE SHOULDN'T BECOME A CAUSE FOR DIVISION: SUPREME COURT  

(a) Case Title:

• Mrs. Varshatai w/o. Sh. Sanjay Bagade v. The State of Maharashtra through its Secretary, Ministry of Law and Judiciary, Mantralaya, Mumbai and Ors. Etc.

(b) Court:

• Supreme Court of India

(c) Date of Decision:

• April 15, 2025

(d) Bench:

• Justice Sudhanshu Dhulia and Justice K. Vinod Chandran

Facts of the Case

The appellant, a former member of the Municipal Council of Patur in Akola district, Maharashtra, challenged the display of Urdu language on the signboard of the Municipal Council building, which had Marathi text at the top and Urdu translation below it. The practice had reportedly existed since the Council's establishment in 1956.
The Municipal Council had rejected the appellant's objection through a resolution passed by majority vote. The appellant then approached the Collector under Section 308 of the Maharashtra Municipal Council, Nagar Panchayats and Industrial Township Act, 1965, who ruled in her favor. However, this decision was overturned by the Divisional Commissioner in revision. The matter reached the Bombay High Court, which initially dismissed the petition.
During the pendency of proceedings in the Supreme Court, Maharashtra enacted the Maharashtra Local Authorities (Official Languages) Act, 2022, mandating Marathi as the official language for local authorities. The case was remanded back to the High Court, which again ruled that the 2022 Act did not prohibit the additional use of Urdu alongside Marathi.

Issues

• Whether the appellant's application before the Collector under Section 308 of the 1965 Act was maintainable
• Whether the use of Urdu alongside Marathi on the Municipal Council's signboard violated the Maharashtra Local Authorities (Official Languages) Act, 2022

Court's Analysis

1. On Maintainability

• The Court noted that after the 2018 amendment to Section 308(1) of the 1965 Act, only the Chief Officer of the Municipal Council could approach the Collector regarding resolutions contrary to law. Since the appellant was not the Chief Officer, her application was not maintainable.

2. On Language Use

• The Court held that the 2022 Act does not prohibit the use of additional languages alongside Marathi. It observed that while Marathi is the official language, there is no bar on using other languages for communication purposes, especially those recognized in the Eighth Schedule of the Constitution, which includes Urdu.
• The judgment emphasized that "language is not religion" and "language belongs to a community, to a region, to people; and not to a religion." It pointed out that Urdu was born in India and developed as a means of communication between people of different cultural backgrounds.

Decision

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, affirming the High Court's judgment that there is no prohibition on using Urdu alongside Marathi on the Municipal Council's signboard. The Court concluded that the case was based on a misconception of law and that the display of an additional language cannot be considered a violation of the 2022 Act.

  WRITE PETITION UNDER ARTICLE 32 CANNOT BE USED TO CHALLENGE OUR OWN JUDGMENTS: SUPREME COURT  

(a) Case Title:

• Satish Chander Sharma & Ors. v. State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors.

(b) Court:

• Supreme Court of India

(c) Date of Decision:

• April 16, 2025

(d) Bench:

• Justices Surya Kant, Dipankar Datta, and Ujjal Bhuyan 

Facts of the Case

The petitioners were retired officers of the Himachal Pradesh State Forest Development Corporation Limited (the Corporation), a public sector undertaking fully owned by the State of Himachal Pradesh. In 1999, the State Government introduced the "Himachal Pradesh Corporate Sector Employees (Pension, Family Pension, Commutation of Pension and Gratuity) Scheme, 1999" (the 1999 Scheme) which extended government pension benefits to employees of state public sector undertakings.
The petitioners had opted for this scheme which required them to forfeit their employers' contribution to the Contributory Provident Fund (CPF). In 2003, concerned about financial viability, the State constituted a High-Level Committee which concluded that the 1999 Scheme was not financially sustainable. Based on this report, the State issued a notification on December 2, 2004, repealing the 1999 Scheme but protecting the pension rights of those employees who had retired between April 1, 1999 (when the scheme came into effect) and December 2, 2004 (when it was repealed). The petitioners, who retired after December 2, 2004, were denied pension benefits under the 1999 Scheme.

Previous Litigation

• A group of similarly situated employees had previously challenged the 2004 notification before the Himachal Pradesh High Court, which ruled in their favor in 2013 (P.D. Nanda v. State of H.P.).
• The State appealed to the Supreme Court, which in State of H.P. v. Rajesh Chander Sood (2016) reversed the High Court's decision and upheld the validity of the 2004 notification along with the December 2, 2004 cut-off date.
• The present petitioners were not parties to the earlier litigation but filed this writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution seeking the same relief and arguing that the Supreme Court's earlier judgment in Rajesh Chander Sood was per incuriam (decided without regard to relevant statutory provisions or precedents).

Issues

• Whether the writ petition under Article 32 challenging the correctness of an earlier Supreme Court decision was maintainable?
• Whether the 2016 judgment in Rajesh Chander Sood was per incuriam?
• Whether the cut-off date of December 2, 2004 was arbitrary and violated Article 14 of the Constitution?

Court's Reasoning and Decision

1. On Maintainability:

• The Court held that a decision rendered by the Supreme Court cannot be directly or collaterally challenged through a writ petition under Article 32. The proper recourse for an aggrieved party is to file a review petition and, if necessary, a curative petition.

2. On the Per Incuriam Argument:

• The Court rejected the contention that the judgment in Rajesh Chander Sood was per incuriam. It held that merely because the petitioners disagreed with the reasoning in the earlier judgment, it could not be labelled as per incuriam.

3. On the Merits:

The Court reiterated that all contentions raised by the present petitioners had already been addressed and settled in the Rajesh Chander Sood case, which had upheld:

• The State's power to fix a cut-off date based on financial considerations
• The reasonableness of the classification between those who retired before and after December 2, 2004
• The State's right to administratively review and withdraw a welfare scheme that was found financially unviable

4. On Finality of Litigation: 

• The Court emphasized that finality of adjudication is a core facet of a sound judicial system, and allowing writ petitions challenging Supreme Court decisions would lead to endless litigation and chaos in the administration of justice.

Decision

The Supreme Court dismissed the writ petition as misconceived, holding that the earlier decision in Rajesh Chander Sood was binding on the petitioners. The Court refrained from imposing costs, considering that the petitioners were retired employees and senior citizens.

Key Legal Principle:

A judgment of the Supreme Court cannot be challenged through a writ petition under Article 32.